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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 
3729-3733 (2012), Donald Palmer (“Relator”) settled his claim 
with defendant C&D Technologies, Inc. (“C&D”), thereby 
entitling Relator to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.  Id. 
§ 3730(d)(2).1  The parties, however, were unable to reach an 
agreement on attorneys’ fees.  In contesting the fees, both 
parties adopted unproductive tactics and strayed from 
professional etiquette, conduct that ultimately caused the 
District Court to proclaim that “[i]t is a hellish judicial duty to 
review and resolve disputed attorneys’ fee petitions, 
particularly in cases, like this one, where the adversaries fan 
the flames at virtually every opportunity.”  App. 8.  While 
Relator sought $3,113,530.50 in fees, the Court reduced that 
amount to $1,794,427.27.2 Relator timely appealed from orders 
                                                 
1 Relator filed this action under seal and was able to prosecute 
the action when the Government declined to intervene.  See 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B). 
 
2 Relator’s total fee demand was $3,278,115.99, of which 
$3,113,530.50 was for statutory fees and the balance of 
$164,585.49 was for costs.  The parties agree that costs owed 
to Relator amount to $164,585.49.  Thus, that figure is not at 
issue in this appeal. 
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that the Court entered on April 25, 2017, and May 24, 2017, 
awarding fees and costs.  We will remand on one narrow 
ground, but otherwise affirm the Court’s orders in all other 
respects. 
I.  FACTS 
 
A.  Background 
 
In this False Claims Act action, Relator claimed that 
C&D manufactured and shipped some 349 defective batteries 
to the United States government for use in intercontinental 
ballistic missile launch controls.  In the summer of 2014, after 
some four years of litigation, the parties engaged in active 
mediation.  Relator subsequently demanded a settlement of 
$1.5 million, plus fees and costs, and the negotiations ended 
without success. 
  
Then, in the spring of 2015, Relator filed a Second 
Amended Complaint in which he expanded his demands for 
alleged damages to $30 million, or twenty times the amount of 
his initial demand.  After the District Court denied cross-
motions for summary judgment, the parties settled the case for 
$1.7 million, representing about six percent of the total amount 
that the Relator demanded in his Second Amended Complaint.  
B.  Attorneys’ Fees Dispute 
 
As a statutory matter, the settlement made Relator a 
prevailing party under the False Claims Act, entitling him to 
an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(d)(2) (emphasis added).  Although the parties settled 
the merits of the case, they were not able to agree on the fees 
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that Relator should recover.  Initially Relator sought 
$2,367,904.85 in attorneys’ fees as of December 31, 2015.  As 
the District Court explained, “C&D responded that the 
reasonable fee amount should have been no more than about 
half that amount, arguing essentially that the case had been 
over-staffed and over-worked by the Relator’s various sets of 
lawyers, and that the fee petition was based on the wrong 
hourly rates and included duplicative entries, inappropriate 
submissions such as for travel time, and, finally, that there 
should be a reduction of the amount awarded for degree of 
success, or rather, lack of success, given the modest settlement 
amount.”  App. 10. 
 
According to the District Court, both parties’ counsel 
were uncooperative and did not act in good faith:  
 
The Court repeatedly offered 
certain guidance for possibly 
bridging the chasm and directed 
the parties’ counsel to exchange 
various pertinent information in an 
effort to minimize areas of 
disagreement.  Counsel were 
equally slow to do so, and the 
hoped for exercise that the Court 
intended as a way to persuade 
counsel of the benefits of good 
faith and good sense achieved very 
little – other than to lead to an 
exchange [of] dueling briefs, 
innuendo and insults. 
 
App. 10. 
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Relator responded to C&D’s objections by increasing 
his fee demand to $3,278,115.99, or, as the District Court 
observed, “almost $1 million more than the fees [he] sought a 
year ago and almost twice the dollar amount of the settlement 
[he] reached.”  App. 11.  Notably, Relator opted to apply 
hourly rates that he “extrapolated” from actual Community 
Legal Services (“CLS”) rates and which were higher than those 
that he originally used to calculate his fee demand.  App. 11. 
 
C.  The District Court’s Rulings 
 
In its decision, the District Court emphasized that it 
“was at all times well aware of who was doing what, to what 
possible end and [had] been entirely attentive to the at times 
puzzling performance of the professional duties of the 
lawyers.”  App. 11.  The Court noted that its resolution of the 
fee award reflected its “hands-on contemporaneous evaluation 
(and necessary attendant factual findings) of the services 
performed and for which payment is sought.”  App. 11.  It 
found that, “[i]n the main, . . . C&D’s opposition to the fee 
petition adopts most of the Court’s guidance as to, for lack of 
a better term, ‘lawyer hours’ and acceptable rates for various 
tasks undertaken.”  App. 11 n.6.  It then proceeded to resolve 
the areas in dispute. 
 
i.  Hourly Rates 
 
The parties and the District Court agreed that the rate 
issue was “best resolved by using primarily – if not exclusively 
– the rates promulgated by the Philadelphia office of 
Community Legal Services.”  App. 15 (citing Maldonado v. 
Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The fee 
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schedule established by [CLS] has been approvingly cited by 
the Third Circuit as being well developed and has been found 
by [the Eastern District of Pennsylvania] to be a fair reflection 
of the prevailing market rates in Philadelphia.” (second 
alteration in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
The Court rejected Relator’s “extrapolated” rates that were 
higher than the CLS rates because “the CLS rates promulgated 
in 2014 remain the actual current rates; neither CLS nor any 
court in any reported opinions that this Court has been able to 
locate have resorted to the ‘extrapolation’ technique now used 
by [Relator’s] counsel.”  App. 16.  Because the CLS rates 
provided a range—rather than a specific dollar amount—for 
reasonable hourly rates, the Court elected “to take an equitable 
approach” and “direct[ed] counsel to use for each time-keeper 
for whom a fee is sought and permitted an hourly rate at the 
mid-point of the applicable range.” 3  App. 16. 
 
ii.  Reasonableness of Hours Claimed 
 
The District Court reduced Relator’s recoverable 
attorney hours for, inter alia, depositions, document review, 
summary judgment motions, a motion for reconsideration, 
Daubert motions, and travel time expenses. 
 
1.  Depositions 
                                                 
3 For example, the 2014 CLS rate range is $600 to $650 per 
hour for an attorney with twenty-five years or more of 
experience – thus, the hourly rate for Relator’s attorneys who 
meet such criteria would be $625, the mid-way point between 
the low and high points of the CLS range.   
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In regard to depositions, C&D objected both to the 
number of hours involved in taking and preparing for 
depositions, as well as the number of attorneys attending some 
of those depositions on behalf of Relator.  In its decision, the 
District Court remarked that during its various meetings 
regarding the fee dispute, it had “frequently addressed the 
matter of the crowd of counsel at the depositions and in 
preparation sessions for them.”  App. 17.   
 
Based on previous guidance that it had issued to the 
parties, the District Court permitted Relator to receive fees for 
the twelve depositions that C&D specifically challenged, but 
limited those fees in each deposition to those generated by the 
Relator lawyer who actually did the questioning and one other 
Relator lawyer actually in attendance.  The Court also allowed 
“[p]rep time compensation” for each deposition of one lawyer 
per deposition (i.e., the lawyer who actually logged preparation 
time for the deposition), “up to a maximum of 1.75 preparation 
hours per hour of documented deposition time.”  App. 17.  If 
less than 1.75 hours/deposition hour was recorded, then the 
lesser time value had to be used.4   
2.  Summary Judgment and                            
Reconsideration Motions 
 
C&D identified more than 900 hours and more than 
$440,000 in fees submitted by Relator for: (1) filing a motion 
for summary judgment; (2) responding to C&D’s motion for 
summary judgment; (3) arguing the motions; and (4) 
                                                 
4 For example, for a three-hour deposition, up to 5.25 hours of 
prep time may be charged or the actual prep time logged, 
whichever is less. 
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responding to C&D’s motion for reconsideration.  The District 
Court stated that it “cannot avoid observing that the number of 
hours attributed to the Relator’s own motion (284.15) comes 
within a day’s worth of the number of hours counsel then 
charged for defending against the C&D opposing motion 
(291.20).”  App. 19. 
 
The District Court was troubled by this reality because 
“one would reasonably expect that at least a good portion of 
the work undertaken to plow the legal field for advancing a 
summary judgment motion would be (or at least should be) 
useful and usable for defending an opposing motion (or vice 
versa), especially for lawyers (such as those representing 
Relator here) with a self-proclaimed expertise in the 
controlling legal issues.”  App. 20.  In regard to oral argument, 
the Court was “puzzled as to how Relator’s counsel can call for 
compensation for 121.2 hours for this activity, slightly more 
than 48 times the length of the entire time in court for both 
parties’ arguments, including pleasantries.”  App. 20.  As to 
Relator’s response to C&D’s motion for reconsideration, the 
Court found that there was “no credible description as to why” 
counsel devoted some seventy-eight hours to “address[] the 5-
page motion[.]”  App. 21.  
 
In the end, the District Court—based on its “knowledge 
of the issues and the briefs as well as having discretion to apply 
its knowledge gleaned from managing the case from start to 
finish”—allowed: (1) sixty percent of the time claimed for 
preparation of Relator’s motion for summary judgment; (2) 
fifty percent of the time claimed for preparation of Relator’s 
opposition to C&D’s motion for summary judgment; (3) thirty 
percent of the time claimed for Relator’s reply brief; (4) a total 
of 42.5 hours for two lawyers to prepare for and one lawyer to 
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conduct oral argument; and (5) twenty-five hours to respond to 
C&D’s motion for reconsideration.  App. 20-21. 
 
3.  Daubert Motions 
 
C&D challenged as unreasonable Relator’s claim for 
203 hours and more than $85,000 in fees in connection with 
Relator’s Daubert motion and his opposition to two such 
motions filed by C&D.5  The District Court agreed with C&D.  
Accordingly, the Court reduced the charges by $58,106.56. 
   
4.  Travel Time 
 
Relator sought fees of 247.70 hours and $129,526.75 for 
travel time logged by two of Relator’s attorneys based in 
Cincinnati.  C&D objected and posited that the travel time be 
reduced by half.  However, the District Court recognized that 
this Court has held that, “under normal circumstances, a party 
that hires counsel from outside of the forum of the litigation 
may not be compensated for travel time, travel costs, or the 
costs of local counsel.”  App. 22 (quoting Hahnemann Univ. 
Hosp. v. All Shore, Inc., 514 F.3d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
Thus, following Hahnemann, the Court held that, “to the extent 
that Relator’s out-of-forum counsel seek reimbursement for 
travel time to and from the forum – for instance, for court 
appearances – that travel time will not be reimbursed.”  App. 
23.  
 
However, the District Court treated “depositions held 
outside of the forum differently, as even counsel located in the 
                                                 
5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 
2786 (1993). 
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forum area would have incurred travel time for those events.”  
App. 23.  It explained:  
 
[W]hile the Court is disinclined to 
allow a claim for multiple lawyers 
to be traveling on someone else’s 
ticket or for any lawyer to charge 
‘full freight’ for any travel, the 
Court is equally mindful that but 
for a professional obligation the 
lawyer likely would not be 
traveling at all, in which case the 
lawyer at least theoretically would 
have been able to enjoy other 
pursuits.  Thus, some time-
oriented compensation for travel 
time is fair for non-forum events in 
the case, though the Court is 
discinclined to authorize 
companion traveling for events 
ultimately attended by multiple 
counsel.  
 
App. 23 (footnote omitted).  Noting that neither party had 
provided evidence of practices relating to fees for travel time 
in the local community, the Court held that, “[b]ecause the 
burden is squarely on Relator to show that the fees he requests 
are reasonable, Relator will bear the weight of this failure.”  
App. 24.  Accordingly, the Court ordered that travel time at 
fifty percent would be allowed for two attorneys to attend 
events occurring outside the forum area.   
 
iii.  “Success” or “Benefits Achieved” Factors 
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C&D argued for a twenty percent reduction of the fee 
award based on Relator’s lack of success.  See Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983) 
(holding that the “degree of success obtained” is “the most 
critical factor” in deciding whether to adjust a fee award).  The 
District Court recognized that “Relator and his counsel 
achieved only very modest results: a $1.7 million monetary 
settlement payment which was about 6% of the Relator’s 
demand in his Second Amended Complaint and roughly 
$200,000 more than the first settlement demand at the start of 
the case in 2014.”  App. 25.  The Court concluded that, “after 
balancing the arguments, the applicable burdens, the Court’s 
knowledge of the case and counsel’s conduct, and the 
foregoing reductions, . . . the appropriate exercise of discretion 
is to further reduce the fee to be awarded to 90% of the 
permissible fee calculated once the reductions imposed in this 
ruling have been applied.”  App. 26.  Accordingly, the Court 
reduced the fee by ten percent. 
 
D.  Judgment and Appeal 
 
In light of the District Court’s decision, the parties filed 
a joint submission regarding Relator’s attorneys’ fees on May 
23, 2017.  The parties agreed that for the purposes of the fee 
award, the Court could use $1,794,427.27 for fees and 
$164,585.49 for costs, the sum of which was $1,959,012.76.  
The Court entered judgment on the basis of this stipulation.  
Relator timely appealed from the fee award, arguing that he is 
entitled to $564,599.12 in additional fees.   
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II.  DISCUSSION6 
 
On appeal, Relator contends that the District Court erred 
by reducing the billable rates and portions of the fee award that 
relate to various motions, depositions, and travel expenses.7  
For the reasons below, we will remand this case only for the 
Court to decide whether the “fees on fees” that Relator seeks 
to collect are reasonable and whether they should be reduced 
based on the results obtained.  We will affirm the Court’s 
judgment in all other respects. 
 
A.  Awards Below C&D’s Suggestions 
 
The District Court reduced the hourly rates and 
attorneys’ hours related to both travel expenses and Relator’s 
reply brief to an amount below that that C&D suggested.  We 
review de novo to determine whether the Court was able to 
reduce the attorneys’ fees beyond the reductions suggested by 
C&D.  See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen. of 
N.J., 297 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2002) (“We review de 
novo the standards and procedures applied by the District 
Court in determining attorneys’ fees, as it is a purely legal 
question.”).  Relator contends that the Court acted sua sponte 
and committed reversible error.  We disagree and find that the 
                                                 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
7 On appeal, Relator does not challenge the District Court’s 
decision to reduce the fee award by ten percent due to the 
minimal benefits that counsel achieved or its decision to limit 
recoverable document review time to 185 hours. 
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Court appropriately exercised its discretion in doing so. 
 
According to Relator, the District Court’s discretion to 
award attorneys’ fees is restricted by the parties’ positions of 
what is reasonable, and it therefore cannot award an amount 
below that which the party opposing the fees contends is 
reasonable.  He relies on Bell v. United Princeton Properties, 
Inc., 884 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1989), for his proposition that “a 
court may not sua sponte reduce the amount of the award when 
the defendant has not specifically taken issue with the amount 
of time spent or the billing rate[.]”  Appellant Br. at 8-9 
(quoting Bell, 884 F.2d at 720).  Relator contends that this 
Court prohibits fee award reductions that were not sought by 
the opposing party for two reasons:  
 
In so deciding, we reasoned first 
that sua sponte reduction of a fee 
request deprives the fee applicant 
of her entitlement to . . . offer 
evidence in support of the 
reasonableness of her 
request.  And second, because 
statutory fee litigation is 
adversarial litigation, there is no 
need to allow the district court to 
reduce a fee award on its own 
initiative.  
 
Appellant Br. at 10 (quoting Bell, 884 F.2d at 719) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Here, the District Court reduced, in three instances, 
Relator’s fee award by more than the amount suggested by 
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C&D.  First,  C&D argued before the Court that the hourly rates 
on the high end of the CLS ranges were adequate to 
compensate Relator, but the Court determined that the hourly 
rate would constitute the midpoint—rather than the high end—
of the CLS rate range.  Second, C&D sought a reduction of 
fifty percent for travel time to the forum by counsel based 
outside the forum.  The Court disallowed all such travel time 
because it was bound by Hahnemann.8  Third, C&D proposed 
that 50 hours would be sufficient for Relator to prepare an 
adequate reply brief.  The Court, however, allowed recovery of 
                                                 
8 Relator relies on, inter alia, Planned Parenthood of Central 
New Jersey for the proposition that “there is no blanket 
prohibition against compensating travel to the forum[.]”  
Appellant Br. at 13.  In Planned Parenthood, we stated that 
“travel time is an out-of-pocket expense under § 1988 that is 
generally recoverable ‘when it is the custom of attorneys in the 
local community to bill their clients separately for [it].’” 297 
F.3d at 267 (alteration in original) (quoting Abrams v. 
Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1225 (3d Cir. 1995)). Thus, 
Planned Parenthood applies to local counsel, see id., while 
Hahnemann prohibits travel expenses for “counsel from 
outside of the forum of the litigation,” 514 F.3d at 312.  Here, 
Relator sought fees for travel time logged by counsel from 
outside the forum: accordingly, Hahnemann—and not Planned 
Parenthood—is on point.  Regardless, even under Planned 
Parenthood, “a court must look to the practice in the local 
community” to determine whether travel time should be 
compensated at the full rate.  297 F.3d at 267.  Here, Relator—
who has the burden to prove that the fees are reasonable, see 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)—
has not presented any evidence regarding the customary 
practice for the billing of travel time in the local community. 
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thirty percent of the 127 hours that Relator’s attorneys billed, 
or thirty-eight hours.   
 
 We reject Relator’s argument and affirm the District 
Court’s reduction of its fee award in the aforementioned 
instances by more than had been argued for by C&D.  The 
Court’s determination of reasonable hourly rates and the 
reduction of fees for the summary judgment reply brief and 
travel time cannot be characterized as sua sponte rulings as 
Relator suggests.  Clearly, C&D objected to the fees at issue 
given that Relator argues the Court improperly reduced fees 
beyond what had been suggested by C&D in its objection – as 
such, the Court did not act sua sponte.  The prohibition against 
the reduction of attorneys’ fees occurs only when the amount 
remains “uncontested” – which is not the case here.  
Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 
1985), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 
3324 (1986); see also Bell, 884 F.2d at 720 (“[T]he two 
justifications for disallowing sua sponte fee reductions . . . 
mandate only that a judge not decrease a fee award based on 
factors not raised at all by the adverse party.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 Furthermore, Relator does not cite any decision that 
requires a district court to award at a minimum the amount of 
attorneys’ fees that the opposing party contends is reasonable, 
and we decline to make such a ruling today.  Rather, our case 
law provides district courts with substantial discretion to 
determine what constitutes reasonable attorneys’ fees because 
they are “better informed than an appellate court about the 
underlying litigation and an award of attorney fees is fact 
specific[.]”  Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. 
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Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1184 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Once the 
adverse party raises objections to the fee request, the district 
court has a great deal of discretion to adjust the fee award in 
light of those objections.”).  Indeed, in Bell—the very case on 
which Relator relies—we recognized that “the type of 
reduction made by the court [need not] be exactly the same as 
that requested by the adverse party” so long as: (1) “the fee 
applicant is given sufficient notice to present his or her 
contentions with respect to the reduction that the district court 
ultimately makes”; (2) “any reduction is based on objections 
actually raised by the adverse party”; and (3) “the district court 
. . . provide[s] a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for 
the fee award.” 884 F.2d at 721-23 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, we conclude that, in making an award 
of attorneys’ fees that abides by those criteria, a court does not 
per se abuse its discretion when its award is below the amount 
that the opposing party accepts as reasonable.  
 
 Each of the District Court’s reductions meets these 
benchmarks.  C&D filed objections to the hourly rates, travel 
time, and summary judgment hours, which put Relator on 
notice as to those very topics. C&D’s underlying objections—
that Relator’s proposed rates superseded the CLS rates, that 
counsel from outside the forum is not typically compensated 
for travel, and that Relator’s counsel billed an inconceivable 
number of hours for the summary judgment reply brief—each 
motivated the Court’s decisions.9  And the Court permissibly 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., App. 16 (“Mr. Palmer’s lawyers’ fee application 
will be adjusted so that only the published 2014 CLS rates may 
be used.”); App. 20 (“[O]ne would reasonably expect that at 
least a good portion of the work undertaken to plow the legal 
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relied on its knowledge of the case and the parties, in addition 
to what it regarded as the inflated amount of hours billed by 
Relator’s counsel, to reach its conclusions.10  See Bell, 884 F.2d 
at 721 (“In determining whether the fee request is excessive in 
light of particular categorical contentions raised by the adverse 
party, and in setting the amount of any reduction, the court will 
inevitably be required to engage in a fair amount of ‘judgment 
calling’ based upon its experience with the case and its general 
experience as to how much time a case requires.”). 
 
 Furthermore, here, after rejecting Relator’s 
unsubstantiated “extrapolated” rates that were in excess of the 
published CLS rates, the District Court was within its 
discretion to apply the mid-point of the CLS rates for a 
“reasonable” hourly rate.  See Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 
                                                 
field for advancing a summary judgment motion would be (or 
at least should be) useful and usable for defending an opposing 
motion (or vice versa), especially for lawyers (such as those 
representing Relator here) with a self-proclaimed expertise in 
the controlling legal issues.”); App. 22 (finding that the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit ordinarily disallows 
compensation for travel costs for counsel from outside the 
forum). 
 
10 See, e.g., App. 20 (“Thus, exercising its knowledge of the 
issues and the briefs as well as having discretion to apply its 
knowledge gleaned from managing the case from start to 
finish, the Court will permit a claim of 60% of the current claim 
for the written work recorded for Relator’s motion, 50% of the 
time charged for opposing the C&D summary judgment 
motion, and 30% of the time recorded for the Relator’s ‘Reply 
Brief.’”). 
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260 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Having rejected the 
prevailing party’s evidence of rates, the District Court was free 
to affix an adjusted rate.”).  In regard to travel time, the Court 
properly adhered to our binding legal precedent and disallowed 
any travel time.  See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., 514 F.3d at 
312.11  And it is logical to assume that the Court applied a lower 
multiplier to the hours logged for the preparation for the reply 
brief than the main brief because Relator’s reply brief was 
significantly shorter and simpler than the main brief.12  See 
Bell, 884 F.3d at 721 (“In order to exercise its discretion fairly, 
a district court needs flexibility in deciding whether to reduce 
a fee request and, if so, by how much.”). 
 
Accordingly, the District Court did not err by reducing 
Relator’s fee award below the amount sought by C&D. 
 
                                                 
11 Hahnemann provides for a narrow exception to this rule 
“where forum counsel are unwilling to represent plaintiff[.]”  
514 F.3d at 312 (quoting Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell 
Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 710 (3d Cir. 2005)).  This exception 
is not applicable here because Relator has not produced any 
evidence that local counsel was unwilling to take on the case if 
not compensated for the travel time. 
 
12 Relator’s attorneys originally billed 127 hours for the reply 
brief.  The seventy percent reduction allowed Relator to 
recover reply brief fees for thirty-eight hours.  Id.  This 
reduction was completely reasonable.  Regardless, the amount 
of fees that Relator contends were sua sponte reduced with 
respect to the reply brief beyond the amount that C&D argued 
for in the context of this case was de minimis – only $4,304.48 
out of nearly $1.8 million in total attorneys’ fees.   
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B.  Deposition Fees 
 
Relator contends that the District Court improperly 
limited the deposition-related fees that he can recover.  We 
disagree.  “We review the District Court’s attorneys’ fees 
award for abuse of discretion . . . .” In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005).  An abuse of discretion 
“can occur if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard 
or to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or 
bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly 
erroneous.” Id. (quoting In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES 
Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 727 (3d Cir. 2001)); accord Halley v. 
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 861 F.3d 481, 488 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 
In a statutory fees case, “[t]he party seeking attorney’s 
fees has the burden to prove that its request for attorney’s fees 
is reasonable” by “submit[ting] evidence supporting the hours 
worked and rates claimed.”  Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (citation 
omitted).  “[T]he party opposing the fee award then has the 
burden to challenge, by affidavit or brief with sufficient 
specificity to give fee applicants notice, the reasonableness of 
the requested fee.”  Id.  Once the challenging party does so, 
“the district court has a great deal of discretion to adjust the fee 
award in light of those objections.”  Id. 
 
In instances where a district court reduces an award by 
a particular percentage or amount, we have stated: 
 
[D]istrict courts, in awarding 
attorneys’ fees, may not reduce an 
award by a particular percentage or 
amount (albeit for justifiable 
reasons) in an arbitrary or 
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indiscriminate fashion.  If the court 
believes that a fee reduction . . . is 
indicated, it must analyze the 
circumstances requiring the 
reduction and its relation to the 
fee, and it must make specific 
findings to support its action. 
 
Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 
2000) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 
As an initial matter, we conclude that Relator met his 
burden by submitting some evidence to support his requested 
deposition fees, and C&D satisfied its burden to challenge the 
reasonableness of those fees with sufficient specificity.  
Regarding the reasonableness of the fees, Relator contends that 
the District Court acted in an arbitrary and indiscriminate 
manner by limiting the deposition fees: (1) to the time at 
deposition for the Relator attorney who did the questioning and 
one additional attorney, and (2) “prep time” compensation for 
one lawyer who actually logged preparation time for each 
deposition, up to a maximum of 1.75 preparation hours per 
hour of documented deposition time.  C&D counters that those 
limitations are reasonable because, prior to “filing of the fee 
petition, the parties and the court engaged in an iterative 
process . . . [where] the district court provided guidance to the 
parties as to what would be considered a reasonable approach, 
such as 1.75 hours of preparation time per deposition hour and 
the time spent at the deposition itself for two attorneys, unless 
Relator could demonstrate that additional attorneys made 
material contributions to the deposition.”  Appellee Br. at 31. 
 
The District Court’s decision to limit fees recoverable 
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for time at depositions to two attorneys is reasonable in light of 
its concern that “the matter of the crowd of counsel at the 
depositions” had to be addressed.  App. 17.  Indeed, the record 
reflects that upwards of four attorneys on behalf of Relator 
attended straightforward depositions,  and Relator failed to 
substantiate the need for the excess attorneys to the Court (and 
does not attempt to do so on appeal).  Accordingly, the Court 
did not abuse its discretion in issuing that limitation. 
 
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 
limited recoverable preparation time to one attorney and up to 
a maximum of 1.75 preparation hours per hour of documented 
deposition time.  The record reflects that Relator seeks to 
recover an unreasonable amount of deposition fees, including, 
among other things: (1) $37,609 for deposing two individuals 
over five hours; (2) $64,412 for deposing a Rule 30(b)(6) 
witness for seven hours; (3) $26,927 for deposing two other 
individuals for 6.2 hours; and (4) $169,120 for seven more 
depositions.  In total, Relator claims nearly $300,000 in fees to 
prepare for and conduct twelve depositions that averaged about 
5.25 hours each.  Relator, who has the burden to show that the 
fees are reasonable, does not provide an argument on appeal to 
substantiate those exorbitant costs, nor did it to the District 
Court.  The Court explained that it had given the parties “prior 
express guidance on the issue of claiming fees for time devoted 
to depositions” throughout the litigation.  App. 17; see also 
Bell, 884 F.2d at 721 (noting that judges may rely upon their 
experience with a case when assessing the reasonableness of a 
fee request).  The Court credited C&D’s challenges, and it 
noted that “Relator … failed to demonstrate why any greater 
amount of preparation time should be allowed.”  App. 18.  
Thus, it did not abuse its discretion when it limited Relator’s 
request for deposition fees. 
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C.  Summary Judgment, Reconsideration, and Daubert       
Motion Fees 
 
As a threshold matter, Relator contends that C&D did 
not meet its burden to notify him of its challenges to the fees 
relating to the summary judgment, reconsideration, and 
Daubert motions.  According to him, C&D made a fatal 
mistake by not submitting affidavits challenging those fees.  
However, he relies on Bell, which provides that an objecting 
party need only submit an affidavit “to the extent the challenger 
seeks to raise a factual issue—for example, a claim that the fee 
applicant’s billing rate was lower than claimed[.]”  Appellant 
Br. at 19 (quoting Bell, 884 F.2d at 720). 
 
C&D does not challenge any of the underlying facts 
supporting Relator’s claim for legal fees, i.e., the billing rates 
and number of hours worked.  Rather, C&D contends that said 
rates and hours worked were not reasonable.  In such instances, 
Bell makes clear that “parties need not submit counter-
affidavits challenging the fee request, so long as they submit 
briefs that identify the portion of the fee request being 
challenged and state the grounds for the challenge with 
sufficient specificity to give the fee applicants notice that they 
must defend the contested portion of their fee petition.”  884 
F.2d at 715.  C&D clearly meets this standard because its brief 
and exhibits before the District Court specifically challenge, 
inter alia, each of Relator’s requested fees, thereby putting 
Relator on notice that his fee request was excessive. 
   
Rather, as with the challenges to the deposition fees, we 
must assess whether the District Court “provide[d] a concise 
but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award” in order 
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to apply the abuse of discretion standard.  Id. at 722-23 
(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437).  The question on appeal 
therefore is whether the Court properly analyzed the 
circumstances of the case and then properly explained its 
reasoning with respect to the fees associated with the summary 
judgment, reconsideration, and Daubert motions.  
 
The District Court permitted sixty percent of Relator’s 
claim for the written work recorded for Relator’s summary 
judgment motion, fifty percent of the time charged for 
opposing C&D’s summary judgment motion, and thirty 
percent of the time recorded for the Relator’s reply brief.13  It 
did so on the basis that: (1) “the number of hours attributed to 
the Relator’s own motion (284.15) comes within a day’s worth 
of the number of hours counsel then charged for defending 
against the C&D opposing motion (291.20)”; (2) expert 
attorneys “in the specific legal fields at issue in this case would 
[not] need to log so many hours on supposedly familiar issues”; 
(3) “one would reasonably expect that at least a good portion 
of the work undertaken to plow the legal field for advancing a 
summary judgment motion would be (or at least should be) 
useful and usable for defending an opposing motion (or vice 
versa)”; and (4) the Court had significant knowledge of the 
case “gleaned from managing the case from start to finish[.]”  
App. 19-20.  The Court’s reasoning was therefore more than 
adequate and far from being the product of an abuse of 
                                                 
13 Relator’s attorneys billed more than 900 hours for summary 
judgment proceedings, including: 284.15 hours to draft and file 
Relator’s motion for summary judgment; 291.20 hours to draft 
and file an opposition to C&D’s motion for summary 
judgment; and 127 hours to draft and file a reply brief in 
support of his motion for summary judgment. 
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discretion. 
 
Regarding the motion for reconsideration, Relator’s 
attorneys billed approximately seventy-eight hours to respond 
to C&D’s motion.  App. 21.  The District Court adopted C&D’s 
recommendation and reduced it to twenty-five hours, 
explaining that: (1) motions for reconsideration are themselves 
rarely successful and are granted only under very narrow 
circumstances, making it relatively easy to respond to them; 
and (2) C&D’s motion for reconsideration was only five pages 
– accordingly, it could not possibly have reasonably taken 
seventy-eight hours to prepare a response.  Id.  This 
explanation is sufficient to warrant the reduction and meet the 
“concise but clear” standard.  As with its determination with 
the summary judgment fees, the Court’s decision could not 
possibly be categorized as being the product of an abuse of 
discretion.  See Rite Aid Corp., 396 F.3d at 299. 
With respect to the fees related to the Daubert motions, 
the District Court adopted C&D’s proposal to reduce these fees 
by $58,106.56, stating that “[t]he Relator’s counsel has not 
persuaded the Court that C&D’s challenges to the fees 
attributed to the Daubert activities are not valid.”14  App. 21.  
In other words, the Court explained that C&D met its burden 
by adequately challenging Relator’s excessive fee request as it 
relates to the Daubert motions, and Relator failed to defend the 
reasonableness of his request in light of C&D’s challenge.  
That makes sense given that Relator’s only response to C&D’s 
                                                 
14 Relator’s attorneys billed more than 200 hours and $85,000 
for briefs regarding Daubert motions: 100 hours to file its lone 
Daubert motion, and 103 hours to draft and file oppositions to 
C&D’s two Daubert motions.   
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challenge was that the parties had to speculate about the 
relationship between C&D’s proposed hours and the real world 
of work actually done on the case, and that C&D’s challenges 
did not give Relator sufficient notice to rebut the claimed 
reductions.  Therefore, the District Court’s reduction of 
Relator’s fee request for Daubert activities was not an abuse of 
discretion.15 
 
D.  Fees on Fees 
 
Finally, Relator argues that he is owed the fees incurred 
in litigating this fee petition before the District Court and this 
Court.  See Prandini v. Nat’l Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 
1978) (“[T]he time expended by attorneys in obtaining a 
reasonable fee is justifiably included in the attorneys’ fee 
application, and in the court’s fee award.”).  Relator raised this 
issue before the District Court, and there is precedent for “fees 
on fees” under Prandini.  However, the Court did not rule on 
the reasonableness of these fees, including the extent to which 
the level of Relator’s attorneys’ success (or lack thereof) 
affects the award.  We decline to address this “fees on fees” 
issue in the first instance on appeal.  Rather, the District Court 
shall do so on remand due to its familiarity with the case and 
the fact that it has been “managing the case from start to 
finish[.]” App. 20; see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 
1941 (“We reemphasize that the district court has discretion in 
determining the amount of a fee award. This is appropriate in 
view of the district court’s superior understanding of the 
litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate 
                                                 
15 As with the deposition fees, we agree with the District Court 
that a reduction of the excessive Daubert motion related fees 
is in order. 
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review of what essentially are factual matters.”); Citizens 
Council of Del. Cty. v. Brinegar, 741 F.2d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 
1984) (“The determination of whether attorneys’ fees are 
reasonable is for the district court . . . .”); Ursic, 719 F.2d at 
675 (“Absent error of law, determination of the reasonableness 
of the fee is for the district court—both in the original instance 
and on remand from this court.”). 
 
The District Court should proceed in two steps: (1) as 
with all fee petitions, it must first determine whether the fees 
on fees are reasonable; and (2) once the reasonability analysis 
is complete, the Court must consider the success of the original 
fee petition and determine whether the fees on fees should be 
reduced based on the results obtained.  See Maldonado, 256 
F.3d at 188 (applying the limited success fee reduction 
rationale to the court’s consideration of fees generated in the 
litigation of a fee petition).  Notably, the reduction analysis for 
the fees generated from litigating the fee petition is 
independent from the reduction analysis applied to the 
underlying litigation.  See Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y 
of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 924 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he fee 
reduction rationale of Hensley, because it is intended to ensure 
the award of a reasonable fee in light of the results obtained, 
applies by force of the Court’s reasoning to fees generated in 
the litigation of a fee petition, and compels us to treat the fee 
petition litigation as a separate entity subject to lodestar and 
Hensley reduction analysis.”). 
 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We will not close this opinion without mentioning that 
although we vacate and remand the case to the District Court 
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with respect to the “fee on fees” issue we recognize and 
commend the District Court for its admirable handling of this 
case which by any standard was quite difficult.  For the 
aforementioned reasons, we will vacate and remand for the 
District Court to decide whether the “fees on fees” that Relator 
seeks to collect are reasonable and whether they should be 
reduced based on the results obtained.  We otherwise will 
affirm the Court’s orders in all other respects. 
 
